BBF v SLB: Competition Law and Governance on trial in British Basketball – September 2025

by | Sep 8, 2025 | Antitrust & cartels, Niet gecategoriseerd, State aid

 

BBF v SLB: Competition Law and Governance on trial in British Basketball

Deen Taj, Solicitor

Beale & Co. (London)

Introduction

British basketball is facing its most serious governance crisis in decades. The British Basketball Federation and Super League Basketball are locked in a High Court battle over who should control the men’s professional league. At stake is more than the future of the competition itself. The case raises fundamental questions about how far competition law constrains sporting regulators, whether public funding obligations under the Code for Sports Governance have been met, and whether the sport can restore the credibility it needs to attract long-term investment.

The parties are as follows:

British Basketball Federation (BBF) is the governing body recognised by FIBA. It oversees the sport in Great Britain and receives significant public funding from UK Sport and Sport England.

Super League Basketball (SLB) was formed by nine of the leading clubs after the collapse of the British Basketball League in 2024. It operated the professional competition in 2024–25 under an interim licence from the BBF.

GBB League Ltd (GBBL) is a United States-backed consortium, led by Marshall Glickman, which was awarded a 15-year licence by the BBF in March 2025 to operate the league from 2026.

“From collapse to contest”

The roots of the dispute lie in the failure of the British Basketball League (BBL), which had been the country’s top-flight competition since the late 1980s. By 2023 the BBL was in financial distress. Despite a £7 million investment deal struck in 2021 with Miami-based 777 Partners, the league struggled with chronic losses, weak attendances and limited commercial revenue. Several clubs faced insolvency pressures, and the ownership model proved unsustainable.

In 2024 the BBL collapsed. This left professional basketball without a functioning league, threatening the immediate disappearance of the men’s game at elite level. The BBF, as the governing body, was forced to intervene. To prevent a complete vacuum, it granted an interim one-year licence to SLB, a company created by nine leading clubs including London Lions, Leicester Riders and Sheffield Sharks.

SLB ran the 2024–25 competition and invested more than £15 million to keep the league afloat. The clubs provided financial guarantees, secured venues and delivered a season, though without the backing of stable broadcast or sponsorship revenues. While this kept professional basketball alive, it was always presented as a temporary measure. SLB nonetheless saw itself as the natural successor to the BBL and pressed for permanent recognition.

The BBF took a different view. Determined to avoid a repeat of the instability that had characterised the BBL, it launched a tender for a long-term operator. The process was presented as open and competitive, aimed at securing outside investment and expertise. SLB objected to the terms, claiming they were unlawful, inconsistent with FIBA rules and overly restrictive. It withdrew from the tender.

In March 2025 the BBF announced that GBBL had been awarded a 15-year licence to run the league. At the same time, it refused SLB’s request for recognition to continue independently. That decision triggered the present litigation.

The legal challenge

SLB’s High Court claim alleges that the BBF has:

  • abused its dominant position under section 18 of the Competition Act 1998 by refusing recognition and insisting on licensing as the only route to operate; and
  • entered into an anti-competitive agreement under section 2 of the Act by granting GBBL a 15-year licence that forecloses competition.

SLB also pleads that the BBF acted irrationally and unfairly, seeking damages of more than £10 million and declarations voiding the licence.

The BBF denies the allegations, arguing that licensing is essential to meet its regulatory duties and FIBA obligations. It counterclaims that SLB and its clubs are themselves acting anti-competitively by boycotting the new structure.

GBBL denies wrongdoing. It says it competed openly and is capable of operating a sustainable league.

Which rules apply?

The UK public procurement rules – Public Contracts Regulations 2015 and the Procurement Act 2023 – do not apply, as the BBF is not a contracting authority. Two other frameworks govern.

Competition law: The court will decide whether the BBF’s refusal of recognition and its agreement with GBBL are objectively justified. Restrictions that are disproportionate or unnecessary may constitute abuse under section 18. If the licence restricts competition by object or effect, it may breach section 2. Comparable cases such as MOTOE[1] in Greece, the International Skating Union[2] decision and the recent European Super League[3] judgment confirm that sporting regulators who also act as market operators are subject to competition law. Each demonstrates that regulatory powers cannot be exercised in a way that excludes rivals unless restrictions are transparent, objective and proportionate.

The Code for Sports Governance: Because the BBF receives £4.75 million annually from UK Sport and Sport England, it must comply with Tier 3 of the Code. This requires transparency, accountability, integrity and value for money. The Code does not mirror procurement law, but it embodies the same principles of fairness and proportionate decision-making. The Sports Minister has asked UK Sport to investigate whether the BBF’s processes complied with these standards.

Legal analysis

Competition law: The BBF clearly holds a dominant position as the sole FIBA-recognised governing body. The key question is whether its refusal to recognise SLB and the terms of the GBBL licence can be justified as necessary and proportionate. If not, they may amount to abuse under section 18 of the Competition Act. Similarly, if the licence is found to restrict competition in its object or effect, it risks contravening section 2.

Governance standards: The Code for Sports Governance imposes mandatory requirements on Tier 3 organisations in receipt of public funds. These include transparency, independent oversight, clear accountability and responsible financial management. Even if the BBF’s conduct survives competition law scrutiny, a finding that it failed to meet its Code obligations could have serious implications for future funding.

Credibility of the sport: Beyond the legal framework, the dispute raises existential questions about British basketball. Prolonged litigation and governance disputes deter sponsors, unsettle investors and risk alienating fans. Without stable and credible governance, the sport will struggle to achieve commercial growth or grassroots development.

Consequences for the sport

The practical effects are already visible. Without recognition, SLB clubs cannot obtain Governing Body Endorsements for foreign players or enter European competitions. Manchester has already missed registration deadlines.  For players and fans, the season is clouded by uncertainty. For sponsors and investors, the litigation underlines the instability of British basketball. The reputational damage makes it harder to secure investment at the very moment the game needs stability and growth.

What happens next?

The litigation is in its early stages. Pleadings have been filed and case management hearings are expected later this year. Key issues for the court will include:

  • whether the BBF’s refusal of recognition and licensing requirement can be objectively justified;
  • whether the 15-year licence with GBBL is anti-competitive in object or effect; and
  • whether SLB’s boycott of the new structure itself constitutes anti-competitive conduct.

In parallel, UK Sport and Sport England are reviewing the BBF’s governance against the Code for Sports Governance. The outcome of that review may influence both the availability of public funding and the credibility of the BBF’s defence.

Concluding thoughts

This case is significant because it sits at the intersection of sport, law and public policy:

Competition law applies to sport: the BBF’s regulatory monopoly cannot be exercised without justification. Courts have previously held in MOTOE and the ISU case that regulators who also control access to markets must not restrict competition unnecessarily. The same principles will be tested here.

Governance obligations matter: receipt of millions in public funding brings binding duties under the Code for Sports Governance. Even if the BBF defends the competition law claims successfully, any failure to meet Code requirements could undermine its funding and authority.

The credibility of the sport is at stake. British basketball has long struggled to secure consistent investment. Governance disputes, prolonged litigation and uncertainty over regulation only deepen the instability. Unless the sport can resolve this dispute and rebuild trust, it risks missing another opportunity to establish itself commercially and at grassroots level.

The High Court will determine whether the BBF’s licensing model withstands competition law scrutiny. The broader challenge is whether British basketball can demonstrate governance standards fit for a modern, publicly funded sport. If not, the danger is not only legal defeat but the erosion of confidence and resources in a game that urgently needs both.

Contact us

Our team at Beale & Co. advises on English competition law, regulatory governance and disputes at the intersection of sport and public funding.  Other members of the Antitrust Alliance advise on these issues in their home jurisdictions.  Please contact us if you would like to discuss how these issues may affect your organisation.

We will continue to monitor developments in the BBF v SLB case and provide updates as the proceedings progress.

The ATA’s brochure on Sports and State aid is available here: Publications | Antitrust Alliance

[1] Case C-49/07, Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), 1 July 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:376.

[2] Case T-93/18, International Skating Union v European Commission, Judgment of the General Court, 16 December 2020, ECLI:EU:T:2020:610; upheld on appeal in Case C-124/21 P, International Skating Union v European Commission, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), 21 December 2022, ECLI:EU:C:2022:1016.

[3] Joined Cases C-333/21, C-334/21, C-335/21, European Superleague Company SL v Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), 21 December 2023, ECLI:EU:C:2023:1031.

Class action lawsuit v FIFA: free movement of workers under EU competition law – September 2025

by | Sep 4, 2025 | Abuse of dominance, Antitrust & cartels

Class action lawsuit v FIFA: free movement of workers under EU competition law

Charlie Bayliss, Solicitor

Beale & Co. (London)

On Monday, 4 August, the Dutch foundation Justice for Players (JFP) announced plans to launch a class action lawsuit against FIFA, marking what has been described as a potentially seismic legal challenge between professional footballers and football’s governing body. The lawsuit targets FIFA’s transfer regulations, which have been criticised for their anti-competitive effects due to the restrictions they place on free movement of players.

The announcement has been followed by reports of Lassana Diarra’s (Diarra) separate £56m claim against FIFA and the Belgian Football Association. The legal momentum follows a significant ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) (Case C650/22) in October 2024, which found that key FIFA rules around contract termination and international transfers violated EU competition law. The ruling originated from a case Diarra brought in 2014, arguing that FIFA’s transfer system unlawfully restricted his ability to work and caused him to lose substantial income. In particular, the case centres on restrictions on worker movements, and whether these amount to a restriction by object under Article 101 TFEU.

Background: Diarra v FIFA

The ongoing dispute between Diarra and FIFA stretches back to 2014, when Diarra fell into a contractual dispute with Lokomotiv Moscow over his salary. Lokomotiv terminated Diarra’s contract, alleging breach, and the FIFA dispute resolution chamber ordered Diarra to pay £8.4m in compensation.

While the compensation amounts were outstanding, Belgian club Charleroi made a contract offer to Diarra. However, FIFA refused to guarantee that Charleroi would not be held liable for the fine, nor did the Belgian FA issue the necessary international transfer certificate to complete the transfer. The certificate was not provided due to the outstanding fines owed to Lokomotiv. This effectively blocked Diarra from exercising his right to free movement to Charleroi, prompting his challenge to FIFA’s rules in the EU courts. While in this case Diarra was moving from Russia to Belgium, these rules are not restricted to these countries and, if applied in different cases, could restrain free movement between EU clubs.

CJEU ruling: a breach of competition law:

Diarra challenged FIFA’s transfer rules on the grounds that they breached EU competition rules by restricting free movement and preventing players from developing their career by moving to a new club. The two challenged FIFA rules are:

  1. Joint Liability: a prospective club is jointly liable for any compensation owed to a player’s previous club if a contract is breached.

 

  1. ITCs: a national association may block the issuance of an ITC if a contractual dispute exists between a player and their former club.

The CJEU found that both rules were incompatible with EU law. The rules restricted free movement of workers – a core principle of EU law – and had the potential for suppressing competition amongst clubs by making it legally and financially risky to sign players in dispute with former clubs. Findings have shown that restricting freedom of movement leads to overall lower wages and lower quality product.

The CJEU emphasised that FIFA’s rules imposed risks upon potential new clubs, including:

  • Legal uncertainty,
  • Significant and unforeseeable financial risks, and
  • Sporting disadvantages, such as delays in fielding new players.

In its decision, the CJEU found that the rules had as their object the restriction, and potential prevention, of cross-border competition. This meant there was no requirement to prove any actual or likely anti-competitive effect of the rules, as they had such high potential for negative effects.

Restrictions can be justified if they are necessary to receive a pro-consumer objective, and if they are indispensable to achieving that objective. The CJEU ruled that the restrictions failed on both counts. The CJEU found that any claim that these rules were necessary to ensure the security of sporting competition was insufficient as the rules went beyond what was required to meet the objective. In its ruling, the CJEU found that the FIFA rules undermined a fundamental tenant of European competition law – the free movement of workers.

This judgement expands on the free movement principle established in the Marc Bosman judgement (C-415/93). The Bosman ruling banned restrictions on free movement of EU players within national leagues and allowed players in the EU to move to another club on expiry of their contract without a transfer fee. Prior to this, clubs held player’s registration until released notwithstanding contract expiry. The Diarra ruling re-cements the importance of free movement of employees in the EU, including in competitive sport.

Fallout and Ongoing Litigation

Following the CJEU decision, FIFA amended its transfer regulations in December 2024. However, the changes were quickly criticised as insufficient by FIFPRO, the international players’ union.

Now, the stakes have escalated. JFP has formally notified FIFA and the football associations of France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark of its intention to pursue a multi-billion pound collective action. The class action seeks compensation for lost earnings suffered by players affected by the unlawful transfer rules, potentially involving up to 100,000 current and former professionals dating back to 2002.

JFP argues that FIFA’s transfer system imposes restrictions on footballers that would be deemed unacceptable in any other profession. While most workers can freely change jobs, footballers have been bound by rules that prevent mobility and depress wages.

FIFA may face significant challenges mounting a defence. The CJEU’s findings directly support the core of JFP’s claims—namely, that FIFA’s transfer framework unlawfully restricted competition and worker mobility, and that any such restrictions were unjustified under EU law.

Conclusion

This ongoing legal confrontation underscores a fundamental principle of EU competition and employment law: employees should be free to move between jobs without undue restriction. The CJEU’s decision reinforces the view that restraints on this freedom are likely to be struck down as anti-competitive by object unless they are clearly necessary and proportionate. Restrictions on free movement of employees are likely to be considered a restriction of competition by object, and therefore more likely to be in breach of Article 101 TFEU.

As JFP’s class action proceeds, it has the potential not only to transform FIFA’s regulatory framework but also to reset the balance of power between football’s governing bodies and the players they regulate.

Contact us

Our team at Beale & Co. advises on English competition law, regulatory governance and disputes at the intersection of sport and freedom of movement.  Other members of the Antitrust Alliance advise on these issues in their home jurisdictions.  Please contact us if you would like to discuss how these issues may affect your organisation.

We will continue to monitor developments in the ongoing FIFA cases and provide updates as the proceedings progress.

The ATA’s brochure on Sports and State aid is available here: Publications | Antitrust Alliance