On 5 February 2026, Germany’s Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt, “FCO”) announced a far-reaching prohibition directed at Amazon.com, Inc. (Seattle, USA) and Amazon EU S.à r.l. (Luxembourg) (together “Amazon”). The authority bars Amazon from using mechanisms that influence the prices set by third‑party sellers on the German Amazon Marketplace. Such price-control mechanisms may in future be deployed only in exceptional situations of excessive pricing—and then only under strict parameters and transparency requirements specified by the FCO.
The decision is notable not only for its substantive outcome—curtailing a major platform operator’s levers over seller pricing and visibility—but also for its legal basis and remedial architecture. The FCO relies on the special regime for major digital companies under section 19a(2) of the German Competition Act (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, “GWB”), alongside the general dominance provisions of section 19 GWB and Article 102 TFEU. In addition, the authority, for the first time, orders disgorgement of the economic benefit allegedly obtained from the infringement, fixing an initial partial amount of approximately EUR 59 million.
The FCO’s intervention sends a clear signal on how Germany intends to police conflicts of interest inherent to “hybrid platforms”, and how transparency obligations towards business users may be woven into competition law enforcement.
1. Amazon’s Marketplace as a Hybrid Platform and Its Market Position
Amazon operates a broad digital e‑commerce ecosystem. In Germany, amazon.de is not merely an online shop but also a marketplace that enables third‑party sellers (“marketplace sellers”) to sell goods directly to end customers. Amazon is present in two roles on the same user interface: first, as a retailer through its own trading business (“Amazon Retail”); and second, as the operator of the marketplace infrastructure (“Amazon Marketplace”), providing access, listing, and transaction-related services to third‑party sellers in exchange for fees and commissions.
This dual role is at the heart of the competition law concerns. In competition policy terminology, a platform on which the operator both sets the rules of display and ranking and simultaneously competes downstream with the business users is referred to as a “hybrid platform”. The FCO emphasises that this structural feature carries heightened risk, especially where the platform’s market significance makes it difficult for sellers to forego access.
According to the FCO, more than 60% of German online retail turnover in goods is generated via Amazon’s trading platform. The site reportedly lists around 1.5 billion distinct items, with more than 200,000 third‑party sellers active on the marketplace. Third‑party sellers account for approximately 60% of the total trading volume on amazon.de, while Amazon Retail accounts for roughly 40%. In the specific market for marketplace services provided to commercial sellers in Germany, the authority points to a turnover-based market share exceeding 70%.
This market context matters because the measures at issue do not simply affect a seller’s price point in isolation. Rather, they operate through the platform’s most valuable asset: visibility and access to demand. Restrictions on visibility can rapidly translate into severe revenue losses—raising the risk of foreclosure of (often small and medium-sized) sellers and, in the authority’s view, distorting the competitive process both within the marketplace and vis‑à‑vis other e‑commerce channels outside Amazon.
2. The Role of the “Buy Box” and the Economic Meaning of Visibility
A central point in the FCO’s case is the “Buy Box” (referred to in Amazon’s more recent terminology as the “Featured Offer” in the purchase field). On a marketplace with many sellers listing identical or substitutable products, the platform must organise presentation through ranking criteria; otherwise customers would struggle to locate relevant offers. On amazon.de, customers typically search products via keywords, receive lists of items, and then click through to product detail pages. These detail pages usually feature a prominently highlighted purchase area—the Buy Box—displaying one offer selected by Amazon along with price and shipping information, coupled with the “Add to Cart” and “Buy Now” buttons.
The selection of the offer displayed in the Buy Box is determined by an algorithm applying multiple criteria—commonly including price, delivery speed, and other performance indicators. The FCO underlines that the overwhelming share of the platform’s trading volume is realised via the Buy Box. Consequently, exclusion from Buy Box consideration is not a neutral, technical re-ranking; it is a major commercial disadvantage that can push sellers into subordinate placement (e.g., the “Other sellers on Amazon” section) from which only a small portion of sales is typically generated. In some cases, where all offers are disqualified, the product page may show only an “All offers” field rather than a featured merchant offer.
Against this background, any mechanism that ties Buy Box eligibility to Amazon-defined price thresholds can effectively function as a de facto price cap—especially for sellers who depend economically on Amazon as a route to customers.
3. The Price-Control Mechanisms Challenged by the FCO
The FCO’s decision targets Amazon’s use of various “price-control mechanisms” applied to third‑party seller offers. These mechanisms are anchored, according to the investigation, in Amazon’s terms and policies, including the “Marketplace Fair Pricing Policy”. If the mechanisms categorise an offer as too expensive, Amazon either removes it from the marketplace entirely or limits its visibility—most importantly by preventing the offer from being displayed as the Featured Offer/Buy Box.
The authority describes three principal mechanisms:
“Price error” mechanism leading to deactivation.
The first category concerns prices characterised by Amazon as “price errors”. Using a statistical model developed by Amazon, offers deemed excessively high and therefore potentially erroneous are removed from the marketplace (“deactivated”).
“Too high price” mechanism leading to Buy Box disqualification.
A second mechanism, also based on a statistical model, categorises prices as “too high”. Rather than removing the offer entirely, Amazon disqualifies it from Buy Box consideration, thereby pushing it into less visible areas of the product page.
“Not competitive price” mechanism based on external price comparisons.
A third mechanism is applied where products are also offered in other online shops or on other marketplaces. Amazon performs ongoing comparisons with a set of online retailers maintained on an internal list. Based on this, Amazon identifies a “competitive price” corresponding to the lowest currently observed price among those retailers. The FCO notes that Amazon may disregard the shipping costs charged by the external retailer, while requiring the marketplace seller’s price including shipping not to exceed the computed threshold to avoid Buy Box disqualification.
The FCO criticises not only the impact of these mechanisms but also their opacity. In its view, third‑party sellers are not sufficiently informed about how the relevant price ceilings are derived, where those ceilings approximately lie, and under what concrete circumstances their offer will be removed or become only partially visible. The authority further states that Amazon does not disclose—either in its contractual documentation or in explanatory materials—how it decides whether a price triggers deactivation rather than mere disqualification, nor the broad functioning of the statistical models generating these thresholds.
From a practical standpoint, these mechanisms can force sellers to adjust prices to avoid losing visibility. Because sellers bear their own economic risk and are responsible for setting prices, the authority sees this practice as a systematic interference with sellers’ pricing freedom, capable of preventing sellers from covering costs and, in the extreme, leading to their displacement from the platform.
4. Competition Law Assessment under § 19a GWB, § 19 GWB and Article 102 TFEU
The FCO qualifies Amazon’s conduct as an abuse under multiple legal bases.
First, the authority relies on section 19a(2) GWB, the special framework introduced to address large digital ecosystems with “paramount significance across markets”. The FCO had already determined in July 2022 that Amazon meets this threshold. The German Federal Court of Justice confirmed that designation in April 2024. Section 19a GWB is designed to enable faster and more targeted intervention against practices by digital conglomerates that may harm competition even beyond a single narrowly defined market.
Second, the FCO also invokes the general dominance provisions under section 19 GWB and Article 102 TFEU. The authority considers Amazon to hold a dominant position in Germany in the market for marketplace services to commercial sellers, supporting this by reference to shares exceeding 70% (turnover-based) and a leading position by user numbers.
Substantively, the FCO’s concern is that Amazon’s intervention in sellers’ pricing, implemented via visibility sanctions and Buy Box exclusion, can distort the competitive process on the marketplace. Because Amazon competes directly with sellers on the same platform, imposing price ceilings on those sellers—even in the form of de facto caps linked to Buy Box eligibility—raises the risk of Amazon steering the platform-wide price level according to its own preferences. The authority links this to two main competitive harms:
Restriction and coordination of competition within the marketplace.
By applying frequently changing price thresholds set at Amazon’s discretion and not grounded in objective and verifiable principles, the platform can shape the competitive process between sellers and limit sellers’ ability to pursue independent pricing strategies.
Foreclosure and reduced contestability beyond Amazon.
The FCO warns that enforcing the lowest observed external online price within Amazon may deter other online retailers outside Amazon from “price attacks”. If any external price cut is rapidly mirrored on Amazon through the marketplace mechanism, the external retailer cannot attract a meaningful customer base with the lower price, reducing the incentive to offer better deals outside Amazon and increasing customer lock‑in.
Importantly, the FCO states that it does not oppose Amazon’s goal of providing low prices to consumers. Rather, it argues that the chosen means—punishing or suppressing seller offers because their prices exceed Amazon-defined thresholds—are not necessary to pursue that goal and are competition‑restrictive. The authority points to less harmful alternatives, such as lowering fees and commissions charged to sellers, thereby creating incentives for sellers to pass on cost reductions to consumers.
5. Remedies and Forward-Looking Conditions: Exceptional Use Only, With Strict Transparency
The decision prohibits Amazon from applying the existing mechanisms in their current form. Looking forward, the FCO does not categorically ban any and all intervention in seller pricing. Instead, it sets a narrow corridor: price-control tools may be used only exceptionally, particularly where a seller’s pricing violates applicable law—explicitly mentioning usurious pricing and “usury-like” price conditions. If Amazon seeks to use a price-control mechanism within this narrow scope, the FCO demands significantly enhanced transparency and procedural clarity.
These obligations intersect with broader platform regulation. The FCO notes that transparency requirements also need to comply with the EU Platform-to-Business Regulation (P2B Regulation), which governs fairness and transparency in platform relationships with business users. In Germany, enforcement of the P2B Regulation lies with the Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur). The FCO states that it coordinated its transparency-related aspects with that authority.
6. Disgorgement of Economic Benefit: An Emerging Remedy in Digital Antitrust Enforcement
A particularly noteworthy aspect is the FCO’s resort to disgorgement of the economic benefit gained through the infringement. The authority is applying, for the first time, the revised disgorgement instrument that was introduced in 2023. Under the new regime, the economic advantage can be established via a presumption, reducing the evidentiary burden and facilitating practical application.
In this case, because the FCO views the infringement as ongoing, it initially set only a partial amount—approximately EUR 59 million. The authority stresses that disgorgement is not a fine intended to punish; rather, it aims to neutralise the benefit and ensure that the infringing company cannot retain gains derived from unlawful conduct. It is not entirely clear how the FCO estimated the economic benefit resulting from the price control mechanism. There are basically two possible ways how Amazon could have benefitted from the illicit practices: if the price control mechanism led to higher prices on the platform, Amazon would have benefited from this through its own sales via Amazon Retail. If the price control mechanism led to lower prices, this would have attracted additional traffic to the detriment of other e-commerce platforms. Amazon would then have benefited from a higher volume of commissions paid for sales on its platform.
If upheld and applied more broadly, this tool could become a significant complement to behavioural remedies in digital markets, where conduct remedies may take time to implement and where structural economic gains may accrue during litigation.
7. Outlook: Implications for Platform Governance and Seller Autonomy
The Amazon decision illustrates a sharpened stance on how competition authorities view platform levers that indirectly yet powerfully shape market outcomes. Two themes stand out.
First, the case underscores that on a dominant hybrid platform, “visibility governance” can be functionally equivalent to direct price regulation. Excluding offers from the Buy Box or removing them from the marketplace because they exceed algorithmically determined thresholds can pressure sellers into adopting platform‑preferred pricing, even where the platform claims a consumer‑welfare justification.
Second, transparency is increasingly treated not merely as a matter of consumer information or contract fairness, but as a competition parameter. Where a platform’s internal models and thresholds are opaque, sellers cannot plan, challenge, or adapt effectively, and competitive constraints may be weakened. The FCO’s detailed requirements on how mechanisms must be described, updated, and communicated point to a more proceduralised conception of competition compliance in platform settings.
1. CMA guidance: labour markets are not an HR carve-out
In recent years, competition authorities have turned their attention to anticompetitive practices in labour markets. Competition authorities have come to view businesses as being in competition to recruit and retain human capital. They are concerned that these competing purchasers of human capital could collude to rig the market, making it harder for individual workers to negotiate for higher wages or move to other firms (which often include competitors of their current employer) in order to secure better terms[1].
In pursuit of this concern, competition authorities across Europe have pursued cases involving salary fixing agreements, no-hire and no-poaching agreements between competing and non-competing firms. There have also been cases where sharing sensitive employment related data has also been investigated and penalised.
In the UK, the Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) has already done the conceptual work for employers. In its guidance “Competing for Talent”[2], it states directly that competition law applies when businesses coordinate on pay or working conditions, and that businesses may be labour market competitors even if they are not competitors in selling products.
The guide identifies three classic “labour market cartel” behaviours: no‑poaching, wage‑fixing and the exchange of competitively sensitive information. It emphasises that unlawful arrangements need not be written and may arise through informal understandings, including social or industry contacts.
The practical takeaway is that HR benchmarking and “market sounding” are not competition‑neutral. They can become the mechanism by which competition is softened, especially where information relates to current or future pay intentions.
This article also addresses another type of restriction affecting employee mobility: restrictive covenants agreed between an employer and a worker as part of an employment contract. These do not always fall within the prohibition on anti‑competitive agreements because competition law is primarily concerned with agreements between undertakings, rather than restrictions agreed in an employment relationship. However, they can still suppress mobility and are under active policy scrutiny in the UK..
2. The Sky / freelance pay decision: what enforcement looks like in real life
The CMA’s 21 March 2025 decision on anti‑competitive behaviour in the purchase of freelance services in sports broadcasting is the UK’s clearest enforcement marker in this space. The CMA’s decision in Freelance Services[3]records multiple instances of information exchange about pay, treated as Chapter I infringements, and it explicitly frames the conduct as reducing uncertainty and substituting cooperation for the risks of competition.
This is important for two reasons.
First, it shows that labour inputs are treated as competitive parameters. The decision is not a footnote. It is a statement that pay‑related information exchange is capable of being “by object” harmful, with no need for a downstream consumer harm narrative.
Second, it shows how ordinary behaviour becomes unlawful. Internal emails talking about not getting into a “bidding war”, wanting to “be aligned”, or presenting a “united front” are treated as evidence of coordination. In other words, language that businesses often use casually is precisely the language authorities treat as incriminating.
3. Government consultation: non-competes, mobility, and the CMA’s view
3.1 The policy move: reforming non-competes as a growth intervention
The UK government has published a working paper on options for reform of non‑compete clauses[4]. The paper frames the key issue as revolving around labour market dynamism, knowledge diffusion and the risk that restraints reduce movement and wage progression. It also sets out a number of policy options Government could pursue to address these challenges (see Section 6 below).
Key options include:
introducing statutory limits on the length of non-compete clauses
banning non-compete clauses in employment contracts
banning non-compete clauses below a salary threshold
combining a ban below a salary threshold with a statutory limit
The significance here is not merely that non‑competes may be narrowed. It is that the policy logic treats mobility as an economic input. That is the same logic that sits behind labour market competition enforcement.
The Government consultation closed on 18 February 2026.
3.2 The CMA response: a “combined” reform model
The CMA has responded to the consultation process. Its response paper gives a window into the likely future direction of antitrust enforcement in the UK with regard to the domain of hiring and salary practices.
The CMA’s response is direct and, for employers, significant. In the CMA states that healthy, competitive labour markets are a driver of growth and that non‑competes are prevalent and can inhibit mobility. It supports reform and endorses a “combined” approach: a ban below an income threshold plus a statutory time restriction above that threshold[5].
The CMA’s core reasoning is worth stating plainly because it is the kernel of the future story.
Time limits alone are unlikely to help workers who cannot afford a period out of the labour market.
A blanket ban may go too far where pro‑innovation justifications are more plausible for higher‑paid roles.
More targeted alternatives already exist and are often preferable, such as NDAs, training clawbacks, and garden leave.
This is not just consultation commentary. It is the CMA positioning itself as a policy actor on labour market mobility and thereby tightening the link between competition policy and employment policy.
4. Competition law reform in parallel: refining the UK regime
Running alongside labour market scrutiny is a wider competition reform agenda. The Department for Business and Trade has consulted on “Refining our competition regime”[6], with the stated aim of improving pace, predictability, proportionality and process, while maintaining CMA independence.
The consultation proposes structural changes including a new decision‑making model for markets and mergers to increase CMA Board involvement and accountability, streamlining the markets regime, and increasing certainty around merger review triggers.
This matters for employers for a simple reason: the CMA is being asked to move faster and to be more engaged. That is likely to increase the velocity of enforcement and the expectation of earlier compliance positioning by businesses, including in labour market conduct.
5. Employment law reform in parallel: the Employment Rights Act rollout
At the same time, employers are dealing with the phased rollout of the Employment Rights Act 2025 and the “Plan to Make Work Pay”[7]. The government’s timeline update makes clear that changes take effect in staged tranches through 2026 and beyond, including day‑one family leave rights, statutory sick pay changes and consultation-driven implementation.
This is relevant here for two reasons.
First, it increases operational and litigation risk in core HR processes at exactly the same time that competition authorities are scrutinising recruitment and pay practices.
Second, it increases the likelihood that employers will use “market” intelligence to manage cost, retention and workforce planning. That is precisely where the CMA warns the risk lies.
6. What this means for business: three scenarios and the practical risks
6.1 Scenario 1: Statutory cap only (soft reform)
If non‑competes are merely capped, many employers will treat this as a drafting exercise. That is a mistake. A cap reduces one tool, but leaves employers more reliant on retention strategies, pay benchmarking and informal market information. Those are the behaviours the CMA treats as high risk.
Practical implication: compliance programmes must extend into HR, recruitment and senior management discussions. Training must cover wage‑fixing, no‑poach risk, and information exchange, not only classic customer‑facing competition issues.
6.2 Scenario 2: Income-threshold ban plus time limit (the CMA’s preferred model)
If the combined model is adopted, businesses face two linked consequences.
Lower‑paid and mid‑paid roles may be largely carved out from enforceable non‑competes.
Employers will be pushed toward alternative protections (confidentiality, non‑solicitation, garden leave, training repayment clauses) and toward better internal controls.
Practical implication: the compliance challenge shifts from drafting to governance. Employers will need clearer rules on what can be shared in salary surveys, how benchmarking is run, and what internal escalation looks like when a competitor raises pay alignment in an industry setting.
6.3 Scenario 3: Broader restrictions on restraints and increased enforcement cadence
If reform is more aggressive, the combination of employment rights expansion and competition scrutiny will compress the margin for error. Businesses will face tighter legal constraints on mobility restraints and more scrutiny of how they manage hiring and retention.
Practical implication: employers should assume that “this is how the industry works” is no longer a safe narrative. The Sky freelance pay decision shows the CMA will treat industry norms as part of the problem, not a defence.
7. Conclusion
The UK is not dealing with a single reform. It is dealing with a reset on two fronts.
Employment reform widens rights and alters HR risk. Competition reform aims to change how the CMA functions and how quickly it acts. Labour market enforcement sits at the point where these two agendas meet.
For employers, the correct response is not to wait for a landmark labour market cartel case in the UK. The CMA’s guidance and enforcement signals already make clear what it considers unacceptable. Businesses that treat recruitment and pay practices as competition‑neutral will be structurally behind the curve.
[3] Decision of the Competition and Markets Authority Anti-competitive behaviour relating to the purchase of freelance services supporting the production and broadcasting of sports content Case 51156, 21 March 2025 available at: Non-confidential decision
[4] Department for Business and Trade: “Working paper on options for reform of non-compete clauses in employment contracts” 26 November 2025
[6] “Refining our competition regime”, Department of Business and Trade (20 January 2026), Refining our competition regime – GOV.UK. The consultation closes on 31 March 2026.
The Belgian Competition Authority (“BCA”) has in recent years made bid rigging a central enforcement priority, and its actions are beginning to speak louder than its words. What was once signalled as an intention – most notably the Chief Public Prosecutor’s announcement on 21 September 2024 that the BCA would for the first time prosecute physical persons – has since become reality. The BCA has now followed through on that commitment, issuing a landmark bid-rigging decision that not only punishes the companies involved but also, for the first time in the authority’s history, imposes fines directly on the individuals responsible. This development, alongside two further BCA decisions issued in July 2024 punishing bid rigging in the fire protection and private security sectors, and the BCA’s ongoing public consultation on a practical guide for public buyers, signals that the authority’s approach to bid rigging has entered a new and more aggressive phase.
Bid Rigging in Competition Law & Potential sanctions
Bid rigging is a form of anti-competitive collusion in which competitors conspire to manipulate the outcome of a public procurement process. Submitting concerted bids for public procurement contracts is prohibited under both EU and Belgian competition laws punishing agreements or concerted practices restricting competition, as well as under public procurement law rules. Infringing the Belgian and/or EU competition rules can be punished with administrative fines imposed by the Belgian and/or EU competition authorities of up to 10 % of the worldwide turnover of the undertakings concerned. The BCA can also impose fines of up to €10,000 on individuals who have participated in the infringement. The BCA’s power to also punish physical persons has existed since 2013 and – as confirmed by the landmark newspaper distribution decision discussed below – is now actively being used for the first time.
Undertakings and persons participating in bid rigging practices may moreover also face penalties under public procurement rules, criminal law, possible exclusion from future public tenders, and damages claims brought by the public authorities that issued the tender and from other undertakings that have suffered damages because of the illegal concertation.
Detection of Bid Rigging
Detecting bid rigging is a challenge for public authorities. They typically examine bidding patterns for signs of collusion, such as unusually high bids, the same companies consistently winning bids, or bids that are close in price.
In 2021, the European Commission published a “Notice on tools to fight collusion in public procurement and guidance on how to apply the related exclusion ground”. This Notice not only provides guidance on how contracting authorities can detect collusion, but also focuses on the possibility of excluding companies involved in bid rigging, and on the possibilities for bidders to ‘self-clean’.
In continuation of these efforts, the BCA has opened a public consultation in January 2026 on a draft guidance document directed at public contracting authorities. The proposed guide is intended as a practical tool to help identify and reduce the risk of competition law violations throughout procurement procedures, such as bid rigging. The guide sets out the relevant competition law principles, highlights the vulnerabilities inherent in public procurement processes, and formulates recommendations and best practices designed to address those risks. The draft also practically describes the specific steps contracting authorities should take where an infringement is suspected and sets out the various ways they may enter into communication with the BCA, including through informal exchanges. The public consultation remained open until the end of February 2026, after which the final version of the guide is expected to be published shortly.
Leniency programmes have so far also proved to be very effective in uncovering collusion in public procurement, providing incentives for companies and individuals to come forward and cooperate with the competition authorities. The latest BCA bid rigging decisions have all been based on leniency applications of undertakings (and persons) that had been part of the illegal practices.
Recent BCA Decisions
bpost, DPG Media, Mediahuis and PPP in the Newspaper Distribution Sector – Press Release
On 13 February 2026, the BCA held bpost, DPG Media, Mediahuis, PPP and two phycical persons liable for manipulating the public procurement procedure for the award of the 2023-2027 newspaper distribution concession, imposing a combined fine of almost €12 million.
All parties involved pursued the goal of securing the award of the concession to bpost, the incumbent postal operator. To that end, they arranged for bpost’s competitor, PPP, not to participate in the tender. In return, DPG Media and Mediahuis committed to allocating additional newspaper distribution volumes to PPP. As a consequence, PPP’s absence from the procedure left bpost as the only remaining bidder and removed any genuine competitive pressure. The BCA found that these practices infringed Belgian and European competition rules, in particular the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements.
Within the framework of the leniency programme, bpost received full immunity from fines after revealing the underlying facts of the infringement. DPG Media and Mediahuis also applied for leniency, resulting in reduced penalties: €3,786,574 for DPG Media (reflecting a 50% reduction for leniency and a 10% settlement rebate) and € 7,788,423 for Mediahuis (40% leniency reduction plus a 10% settlement rebate). PPP was fined €323,486, benefiting only from the statutory 10% settlement reduction.
Importantly, this decision marks the first time the BCA has exercised its long-standing power to prosecute and fine natural persons. Two individuals – both employed by bpost at the time of the infringement – were fined a total of €6,300. The BCA granted a 50% reduction in view of the unprecedented nature of such sanctions, in addition to the statutory 10% settlement reduction. Thirteen other individuals received immunity from prosecution due to their cooperation during the investigation.
2. ANSUL/SOMATI FIE and SICLI Groups in the Fire Protection Sector– Press Release & Decision
On 8 July 2024, the BCA determined that ANSUL, SOMATI FIE and SICLI, major players in the fire protection industry, had engaged in bid rigging activities over seven years and violated Belgian and EU competition law. The activities mainly concerned the sale, rental and maintenance of fire extinguishers and hose reels.
The companies manipulated public procurement procedures by allocating public contracts among themselves to each retain their legacy customers in Belgium. They used tactics such as submitting “cover” bids – deliberately overpriced bids designed to ensure that a particular company would win the contract. The aim was to retain certain public customers for public contracts put out to public tender or negotiated without publicity, by refraining from competing with each other.
The practices were especially concerning given the essential nature of the products and the vulnerability of the customers involved, such as schools, municipalities, social housing, and public transport companies.
The ANSUL/SOMATI FIE group reported the cartel under the BCA’s leniency programme and was granted immunity from fines. The SICLI group, which cooperated in the investigation, received a 50% reduction in fines, resulting in a fine of €2.2 million. Six individuals were also granted immunity from prosecution. In addition and unusually, ANSUL/SOMATI FIE formally undertook to compensate the defrauded customers, in accordance with a compensation protocol attached to the decision, which further demonstrated its recognition of the wrongdoing and for which it was granted an additional 5% fine reduction.
3. Securitas, G4S, and Seris in the Private Security Sector – Press Release & Decision
On 3 July 2024, the BCA imposed fines totaling over €47 million on Securitas, G4S and Seris for their involvement in a complex cartel that operated from 2008 to 2020. The cartel members engaged in several anti-competitive practices regarding public procurement procedures, including coordinating their bidding intentions for certain procedures and ensuring that certain contracts would remain in the hands of certain suppliers, agreeing on minimum hourly tariffs for their security services and agreeing not to poach each other’s employees.
The leniency programme also had an important impact in this case too. Securitas did not receive any fine as it obtained immunity from fines and G4S and Seris also benefited from fine reductions under the leniency programme. All parties also received a further reduction from fines as they decided to settle the case. 11 individuals obtained immunity from prosecution, and one person was also prosecuted in the US. Conclusion and outlook
The BCA’s renewed focus on bid rigging marks a significant shift in competition law enforcement; the penalties for both undertakings and individuals are increasing. It should be noted that in all bid rigging cases involving practices from before 2019 the BCA could only impose fines of up to 10% of the Belgian turnover of the infringers. Since 2019, the BCA is empowered to impose fines of up to 10% of the worldwide consolidated turnover of the undertakings involved, which will no doubt lead to an increase in the amounts of fines. Moreover, the BCA has now made good on its long-standing announcement that it will no longer refrain from using its powers to prosecute individuals – a shift definitively confirmed by the newspaper distribution decision.
The BCA’s concurrent public consultation on a practical guide for public buyers further signals a broader enforcement and awareness strategy: not only are companies and individuals at greater risk of prosecution, but contracting authorities are also being equipped with better tools to detect suspicious bidding behaviour at the earliest opportunity.
More decisions punishing bid rigging are expected. The dawn raids carried out on several companies active in the supply of bus and coach passenger transport services suspected of bid rigging are likely to result in further proceedings in due course.
Companies must now adopt a proactive stance on compliance, incorporating comprehensive training, robust internal report mechanisms, through documentation practices, and advanced bid management systems. Significant legal questions also arise when forming a consortium bid with competitors where it is crucial to verify and ensure that collaboration can be objectively justified and any information exchange is restricted and confined solely to the current bid.
For businesses contemplating leniency applications, consulting legal counsel is essential to effectively navigate the leniency programme. Legal advice also remains crucial about whether a company is undergoing a self-cleaning process or suspects competitors of engaging in bid rigging. Ultimately, while the BCA represents an important first step in tackling bid rigging, companies should also be prepared for potential damages claims in the courts.
In the current public procurement environment, robust compliance and strategic legal planning are the best bids for success.
Several years ago, Spain was ordered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to pay compensation to two Dutch undertakings. Although the arbitral award had become final, the Amsterdam District Court (District Court) ruled in a judgment dated 5 February 2025 (English translation) that the compensation constituted unlawful state aid. The undertakings involved were also ordered to compensate Spain if the arbitral award is successfully enforced.
THE CASE
The case concerns a subsidy scheme introduced by Spain in 2007 in favour of investors in solar energy. In 2010, Spain reduced the amount of the subsidy and shortened the period of eligibility. The EU Commission (Commission) was not informed in any way of the “2017 scheme” or the changes implemented in 2010. In 2014, Spain withdrew the amended 2007 scheme and replaced it with a new scheme. This time the “2014 scheme” was notified to the Commission as state aid. In a decision of 10 November 2017 (Approval Decision), the Commission approved both the 2014 scheme and the payments made under the 2007 scheme including its 2010 amendments (marginal 3.3).
The Dutch undertakings AES and AEF invested in Spanish solar energy installations from 2007 onwards. As a result of the changes made to the 2007 scheme in 2010, they received less subsidy than they had expected. AES and AEF claimed to have suffered damage as a result and initiated arbitration proceedings under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). In an arbitral award dated 28 February 2020, the PCA ordered Spain to pay €15.4 million to AES and €11.1 million to AEF. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court upheld this award in a decision dated 23 February 2021. Subsequently, Spain notifiedSee marginal 165 of the Approval Decision regarding the notification obligation. The notification is being examined by the Commission under number SA.64761. the arbitral award to the Commission as an aid measure.
In an attempt to collect the damages awarded, AES and AEF initiated proceedings before the Court for the District of Columbia (Washington DC). They subsequently assigned their right to claim the arbitral award to the American undertaking Blasket Renewable Investments LLC (Blasket).
In order to pre-empt the consequences of a possible enforcement of the arbitral award, Spain initiated proceedings before the District Court. Despite a jurisdictional objection raised by AES and AEF, the District Court declared itself competent to hear Spain’s claims in an interim judgment of 29 May 2024. Following this ruling, which is discussed in the blog: State aid and arbitration: the New York Convention versus Brussels I-bis (Dutch only), the District Court is now considering the merits of the case.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
THE STATE AID RULES
According to the District Court, a measure that qualifies as state aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU may not be implemented before the Commission has given its approval. State aid paid in breach of this standstill obligation is unlawful.
A judgment ordering a Member State “to make a payment to a private undertaking” may constitute State aid. Such a judgment may “have res judicata effect (or be final). A judgment with res judicata effect may not be called into question again. However, the principle of the primacy of Union law entails that the national court must ensure the full effectiveness of Union law provisions and must set aside any conflicting national provision, ex officio where necessary. This also applies to national rules that establish the principle of res judicata. Therefore, the final nature of a judgment does not preclude the possible ordering of recovery of unlawfully paid State aid” (marginal 5.8). In the case of unlawful State aid, the national court is obliged to “take the necessary measures to ensure that the beneficiary (AES and AEF in this case) cannot freely dispose of the aid or the advantage received until the Commission has ruled on the compatibility of that aid with the internal market (marginal 5.9).
EU LAW OR ECT
According to established ECJ case lawSee the judgment of 2 September 2021 (Komstroy) in Case C-741/19, marginal 23 and the judgments cited therein. the District Court concludes that the provisions of the ECT are part of EU law. Spain is therefore obliged to comply with the arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of Article 10 ECT. At the same time, Spain must also comply with the obligations arising from Articles 107 and 108 TFEU (marginal 6.4). However, the ECT does not affect the requirement that aid measures taken by a Member State must first be notified and may only be implemented after approval by the Commission. This also applies to awards that confer an economic advantage on undertakings and may therefore constitute State aid. Where applicable, the Member State concerned is obliged, on the basis of the principle of sincere cooperation (Article 4 TEU), to notifySee also marginal 165 of the Approval Decision. the judgment to the Commission. It is irrelevant whether the judgment was handed down by a national court or by an arbitral tribunal. After all, it is the payment obligation that must be examined for compatibility with the internal market (marginals 6.4-6.9). The District Court thus reaches the intermediate conclusion that, in addition to the ECT provisions, the EU rules on state aid also apply to the payment obligation arising for Spain from the arbitral award (marginal 6.13).
STATE AID TEST
The amounts paid by Spain under the subsidy schemes are not in dispute. The present case concerns solely the question of whether the compensation awarded by the arbitral tribunal to AES and AEF constitutes State aid, and if so, when that aid was granted (marginals 7.1–7.2). These questions were also raised in the Micula caseJudgment of 2 October 2024 of the General Court (European Food), joined cases T‑624/15 RENV, T‑694/15 RENV and T‑704/15 RENVECLI:EU:T:2024:659 (Micula 2024), and the judgment of 25 January 2022 of the ECJ (European Food), case C‑638/19. ECLI:EU:C:2022:50 (Micula 2022).. Unlike in the present dispute, in the Micula case the arbitral award had already been enforced and the Commission had ordered recovery. However, the District Court considers this irrelevant and concludes that the judgments in the Micula case are particularly suitable for answering the legal questions in the case at hand (marginals 7.3-7.6).
During the investigationWithin the meaning of Articles 6-11 of Regulation 2015/1589. by the Commission into the 2014 scheme, arbitral proceedings between, several investors and Spain were ongoing. In this regard, the Commission noted in the Approval DecisionSee marginal 165 of the Approval Decision. that the award of damages by the arbitral tribunal would qualify as State aid subject to notification within the meaning of Article 108(3) TFEU. According to the District Court, the arbitral tribunal’s finding that the damages are compatible with the internal market (marginal 6.9) is irrelevant. Only the Commission is competent to take such a decision. In line with this, the Dobeles HES and Mytilinaios/DEI judgments cited by AES and AEF fail to demonstrate that Spain’s payment obligation under the arbitral award does not constitute a new independent aid measure. In the District Court’s view, it follows from the Dobeles HES and Micula 2024 judgments that a payment obligation of an EU Member State arising from an arbitral award may indeed constitute state aid (marginals 7.8-7.14).
In the arbitral award, the PHA effectively awarded AES and AEF compensation for damages resulting from what they claimed was an unlawful amendment to the 2007 scheme. At the same time, this compensation correspondsSee in this context the Micula 2024 judgment, marginals 172-175, to which the District Court refers in footnote 39. to an amount that is established to be state aid. Namely, a higher subsidy than that to which AEN and AEF are entitled on the basis of the aid schemes approved by the Commission. Consequently, the compensation meets the four conditions for qualification as state aidSee marginal 5.4.2. as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU (marginals 7.15-7.20).
NO ABUSE OF RIGHTS
The moment on which the beneficiary acquires an irrevocable legal claim to State aid under the applicable national rules is the date on which State aid is granted. The fact that Spain has not yet made any payment under the arbitral award is therefore irrelevant (marginals 7.21-7.23). The confirmation by the Swiss Supreme Court of the arbitral award made the awarded compensation final. From that point onwards, Spain is required both to notify the payment obligation and to comply with the standstill obligation (marginals 7.23.3). By adhering to these requirements, Spain has not abused its rights (marginals 7.29-7.30).
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Although AES and AEF have transferred their claim from the arbitral award to Blasket, Spain has an interest in the claim for a declaratory judgment concerning the arbitral award against them. After all, the transfer in question does not mean that AES and AEF did not receive any advantage. Blasket only purchased the right to claim and is not considered to be advantaged in the eyes of the District Court. A claim for recovery from Blasket will therefore not succeed. Furthermore, a different interpretation would mean that beneficiary undertakings could escape the application of EU law by selling the right to claim to a party outside the EU. As the Commission has convincingly pointed out, this is undesirable (marginals 7.43-7.47).
CLAIMS FOR REPAYMENT OF STATE AID
According to the Eesti Pagar judgment, the legal basis for the recovery of State aid must be grounded in national law. In this regard, Spain has rightly argued that AEN and AEF have been unlawfully enriched by the arbitral award within the meaning of Article 6:212 of the Dutch Civil Code:
1.
a payment of aid by an EU Member State during the standstill obligation is unlawful;
2.
AES ad AEF have obtained an advantage to which they were not entitled and have been enriched as a result of the arbitral award;
3.
Spain’s financial position will be diminished if, in the event of a succesful future enforcement of the arbitral award (anywhere in the world), it is required to make a payment to Blasket (or its possible legal successor).
Although Spain has not yet paid anything, this does not alter the fact that Spain has a contingent claim. On the basis of the principle of loyalty, Spain is indeed required “to take and adopt all measures necessary to ensure that no payment arising from that State aid [measure] can be made as long as the Commission has not decided on the compatibility of that payment obligation with the internal market” (marginals 7.49-7.57).
DECISION
Briefly summarized the District Court:
(i)
declares that the arbitral award constitutes a measure constituting unlawful State aid;
(ii)
orders AES and AEF to pay the amount that Spain must pay to Blasket upon enforcement of the award;
both as long as the Commission has not declared this measure to be wholly or partly compatible with the internal market.
COMMENTS
ECT ARBITRATION
Arbitration under Article 26(2)(c) ECT has produced interesting case law in recent years. Pursuant to Article 26(3) ECT, Member States have agreed in advance to arbitration. According to the Komstroy judgment, this means that disputes between an investor from one Member State and another Member State concerning Union law “may be removed
from the judicial system of the European Union such that the full effectiveness of that law is not guaranteed”. According to the ECJ, Article 26(2) of the ECT must therefore be interpreted
“as not being applicable to disputes between a Member State and an investor of another Member State concerning an investment made by the latter in the first Member State” (marginals 62-66). In the present case, the possible lack of jurisdiction of the PHA was not a matter of dispute before the District Court. However, it does show that the full effect of EU law is not guaranteed in the event of arbitration based on the ECT. From the text of the judgment under discussion, it is not clear how the PHA actually applied the EU state aid rules to the case at hand. In any event, the District Court is of the opinion that the state aid rules were not properly recognized, leading to the award of unlawful state aid.
RES JUDICATA AND PRIMACY OF EU LAW
The arbitral award was confirmed by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court and thus became final. According to the District Court, this does not preclude the possible award of a recovery order of potentially unlawfully paid state aid. The District Court refersSee footnote 16. in this context only to the Commission Communication on the enforcement of State aid rules by national courts. At least as relevant is the Amicus Curiae observation of 22 December 2023 the Commission submitted to the District Court. In line with the aforementioned Communication, the Commission describes the role of national courts in state aid cases. What really makes the observation noteworthy is the description of the EU State aid rules as “fundamental rules that are indispensable for the functioning of the Union’s internal market and must therefore be regarded as national rules of public policy“. So even if none of the parties to the proceedings has raised a violation of the state aid rules, the Commission is of the opinion that the national court must examine ex officio whether the state aid rules have been complied with. An important pointer for professional practice!
QUALIFICATION AS STATE AID
One of the elements that determine whether a measure qualifies as state aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU is that the measure must originate from the State and be financed by the State. According to, among others, the Tercas judgment, these are two cumulative conditions (marginal 70). The District Court only mentions the funding by Spain (see marginal 7.20). Why the arbitral award must be attributed to Spain remains unmentioned. AEN and AEF may have recognised this aspect. After all, they argued that the “payment in the context of the enforcement of the arbitral award constitutes the aid measure” (marginal 7.14.4). Does the payment decision therefore, in the view of AEN and AEF, produce the required attribution? If so, there may not yet be any state aid involved. After all, a decision to make the payment is still lacking. From this perspective, it is unfortunate that the District Court refused to address the possible relevance of the Mytilinaios/DEI judgment (marginal 7.14.2).
SHOW STOPPER
The Commission apparentlySee marginals 4.4 and 7.45.2.wants to prevent, at all costs, undertakings receiving unlawful state aid from being able to avert recovery by selling the right to claim to a third party. The District Court’s judgment seems to provide the desired show stopper. An arbitral tribunal may still, in violation of the state aid rules, order a Member State to pay compensation to an undertaking. This undertaking can sell that claim. However, it must now take into account the possibility that it will have to compensate the Member State if the buyer successfully enforces the arbitral award in a distant foreign country. This prevents unlawful state aid from being paid. Moreover, the sale of a right to claim arising from an (arbitral) award is no longer a no-lose transaction.
No-poach agreements are arrangements between two or more employers not to hire each other’s employees. These may take the form of ‘no-hire agreements’, which prohibit both active or passive hiring of employees from other parties, or ‘non-solicit agreements’, when the parties agree not to actively approach each other’s employees.[1] Employees are typically not aware of such agreements and therefore have no opportunity to seek compensation for these practices.[2]
Recently such agreements have come under increasing scrutiny under EU competition law. While no-poach agreements have been recognized as a breach of competition law already before[3], the issue has gained attention and is being discussed in the European Commission and on a national level as well.[4] In May 2024 the European Commission issued a Competition policy brief on Antitrust in Labor Markets[5]. The Commission included similar warnings in the Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 (Horizontal Guidelines)[6] and the Guidelines on collective agreements by solo self-employed people.[7] Moreover, on 2 June 2025, the Commission adopted its first decision imposing fines on two food delivery companies Delivery Hero and Glovo for engaging in no-poach agreements, exchanging commercially sensitive information and allocating geographic markets.[8] The Delivery Hero and Glovo decision confirms the Commission’s approach to treating no-poach and wage-fixing agreements as by-object restrictions of competition.
No-poach and wage fixing agreements
No-poach and wage-fixing agreements are generally regarded as restrictions of competition by object on the relevant hiring market under Article 101 (1) TFEU or the national equivalent.
No-poach agreements have detrimental effects, like reducing labor market dynamism with resulting negative effects on employee compensation, firm productivity, and innovation. Such agreements reduce wages, and the companies have less incentive to raise wages. This also prevents efficient allocation of productive employees to productive firms, therefore resulting in overall declining productivity.[9] This shows that antitrust is not only about direct harm to consumers, but can extend to other matters that affect competition and eventually consumer welfare.
The Commission considers that no-poach agreements will be compatible with EU competition law only in limited circumstances, however they rarely satisfy the conditions necessary to be treated as ancillary restraints and they are also unlikely to fulfil the criteria for exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.[10] No-poach agreements may be permissible if they are directly connected to, proportional objectively necessary for the implementation of a legitimate, competition-neutral main transaction, for example a merger. Such so-called ancillary restraints fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU and are not prohibited.[11]
It must be noted that evaluating if an agreement qualifies as an ancillary restraint and is allowed is not always an easy task, as parties must demonstrate the satisfaction of the three criteria to avoid the full scrutiny of Article 101 TFEU. This burden is particularly high because proving the necessity and proportionality of a restraint in a specific context often requires showing that the transaction could not reasonably be achieved by less restrictive means.
Companies may argue that no-hire arrangements serve legitimate purposes, for example, protecting substantial investments in employee training or preventing the leakage of trade secrets when staff move to competitors.[12] However, EU regulators generally dismiss these justifications.
Considering the Commission’s stance in the guiding documents and now also in case-law, national competition authorities in Europe now view these practices as serious antitrust infringements, recognizing that they harm workers’ opportunities and distort the allocation of an essential resource (labor) in the economy.
Competition in labor markets in the Baltics
The labor markets are often national, regional or local, therefore the involvement of national competition authorities is of high importance.[13]
The competition council in Lithuania has adopted a decision on wage-fixing for basketball players, which is now pending a request for a preliminary ruling at the ECJ.[14] This shows the competition authorities stance and approach to such agreements as by-object agreements that harm competition. However, the other two Baltic countries have yet to become more active in this area.
While the Estonian competition authority has yet to voice its views on the matter, the Latvian competition authority has issued a guidance on competition in labor markets. It states that the Latvian Competition law mirrors the EU’s stringent stance on no-poach agreements. Section 11 of the Latvian Competition Law, which implements Article 101 TFEU at the national level, expressly prohibits agreements between market participants that have the object or effect of restricting competition in Latvia. This includes agreements fixing prices, including wages, or allocating markets, including labor market allocation.[15]
The guidance clarifies that collusion in hiring or employment conditions is a serious violation of the law – such conduct is considered a restriction of competition by object, because it limits employees’ mobility, depresses wages, and deprives firms of the ability to compete for skilled labor.[16] While, to date, there have been no infringement decisions in Latvia for no-poaching, the Competition councils guidance signals that it is ready to enforce against any employer cartels in labor markets, in line with EU enforcement trends.
Conclusion
From a regulatory perspective, no-poach agreements are now clearly established as antitrust violations within the EU. Article 101 TFEU provides the legal basis to review these pacts as by-object restrictions, and recent Commission guidance and decisions illustrate a robust approach to keeping labor markets competitive.[17]
Companies operating in Europe should ensure that any discussions or arrangements with rivals do not stray into employment matters. Both the European Commission and national authorities have made it clear that collusion not to hire or to fix wages is illegal and will be scrutinized as any other cartel.
No-poach agreements are on the antitrust radar, and companies should be as cautious when discussing these topics with competitors as they should be with pricing and market strategies. Enforcement is evolving in this area, and companies should turn to their legal advisors to evaluate their agreements to see if they do not breach Article 101 TFEU or the national equivalent.
[5] Competition policy brief, Antitrust in Labour Markets, (n1).
[6] Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements (“Horizontal Guidelines”), OJ C 259, 21.7.2023, pp. 1-125, paragraph 279, available: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52023XC0721(01) Commission classifies wage-fixing and no-poach collusion as forms of “buyer cartels” – agreements between buyers of labor (employers) to coordinate purchase prices (wages) or to share sources of supply (workers)
Ireland CCPC Annual Report 2024: Competition Law Trends and Takeaways
Paul Henty, Beale & Co.
Dublin and London
Introduction
The Irish Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) recently published its Annual Report for 2024, marking its tenth year as Ireland’s competition regulator. The report reveals a notable increase in enforcement activity, continuing trends seen in 2023.
This article reviews key developments in merger control, cartel enforcement, abuse of dominance, and gun-jumping, comparing them to the 2023 report. It also considers how the CCPC’s level of activity compares to other European competition authorities, and what these developments mean for in-house counsel and business leaders regarding strategic planning, risk management, and transaction structuring.
Merger Control: Rising Notifications and a Landmark Prohibition
Merger activity in Ireland accelerated in 2024. The CCPC handled 82 merger notifications, representing a 21 percent increase from 2023. Despite this heavier caseload, the authority improved its turnaround times through wider use of the Simplified Merger Notification Procedure (SMNP). Approximately 71 percent of merger determinations were cleared under the SMNP, compared to around half in 2023. SMNP cases were completed in an average of 13.3 working days, while standard Phase 1 reviews averaged 16.3 days (both improvements on the prior year).
The most significant development in 2024 was the CCPC’s prohibition of Dublin Airport Authority’s proposed acquisition of QuickPark, the principal independent long-term car park at Dublin Airport. The transaction would have given the airport operator control of more than 90 percent of long-term airport parking, creating a near-monopoly likely to reduce consumer choice and increase prices. This was the first outright prohibition in several years and signals a more assertive merger control stance.
In total, eight Phase 2 investigations were opened in 2024, of which three were cleared unconditionally, one with remedies, and three carried forward into 2025. Eleven notifications required extended Phase 1 reviews, comparable to the previous year. The trend suggests a maturing merger regime: the CCPC is prepared to dig deeper where overlaps arise, while processing straightforward cases efficiently.
The authority also launched a consultation on revised Merger Guidelines in late 2024 and signalled potential future ‘call-in’ powers for non-notifiable transactions. These developments suggest that early competition law assessment will become increasingly critical, even for mid-sized transactions.
Cartel Enforcement: Raids, Prosecutions and International Cooperation
The CCPC increased its anti-cartel enforcement activity in 2024, opening five new investigations, two of which involve suspected collusion. Dawn raids were conducted at business premises as part of ongoing cartel inquiries, marking a further normalisation of unannounced inspections as an enforcement tool. This follows a revival of criminal cartel enforcement activity seen in 2023, including dawn raids at multiple premises linked to bid-rigging allegations in the transport sector.
A notable case progressing towards trial concerns alleged bid-rigging in public school transport services. This case involves multiple operators and will be one of the first criminal cartel prosecutions in Ireland in many years. The CCPC also assisted the Italian Competition Authority in a Dublin-based search at Ryanair’s headquarters as part of an abuse of dominance investigation, underscoring greater cross-border cooperation.
The Competition (Amendment) Act 2022, which implements the EU ECN+ Directive, has fundamentally reshaped Irish enforcement. The CCPC now has the power to impose administrative fines through in-house adjudication, issue formal fining guidelines, and offer settlements for leniency applicants. These new tools allow the authority to pursue civil enforcement routes alongside traditional criminal prosecution, accelerating outcomes and increasing deterrence.
Abuse of Dominance: Renewed Interest in Market Power
Two of the five new competition investigations opened in 2024 relate to alleged abuse of dominance. This marks a shift towards greater scrutiny of unilateral conduct, an area where Irish enforcement has historically been limited.
The first investigation related to healthcare software company (Clanwilliam) and the provision of Electronic Patient Record (EPR) software and related services such as electronic referrals and text messaging services. The second investigation related to Dublin Port Company and the provision of port infrastructure at Dublin Port and/or the provision of port towage services at Dublin Port.
The 2022 reforms empower the CCPC to impose administrative fines of up to 10 percent of turnover for dominance abuses, aligning Ireland more closely with European practice. The establishment of a dedicated adjudication unit is expected to make dominance enforcement more practical and responsive. Companies with strong market positions should therefore review pricing, rebate, and exclusivity policies for potential competition risks.
Gun-Jumping: Enforcement of Standstill Obligations
For the first time in several years, the CCPC opened an investigation into suspected gun-jumping in 2024. This reflects a growing willingness to enforce standstill obligations against companies that close transactions prior to obtaining clearance. The Competition (Amendment) Act 2022 strengthened the CCPC’s powers to prosecute gun-jumping and increase penalties, bringing Ireland in line with other active EU jurisdictions such as France and Spain.
Businesses should ensure that Irish thresholds are properly assessed in multi-jurisdictional transactions, and that no integration steps occur before clearance is received. The CCPC’s focus on procedural compliance demonstrates that even technical breaches may now attract enforcement attention.
Comparison with European Peers
Relative to its size, the CCPC is now one of the more active national competition authorities in Europe. The authority’s increasing use of administrative powers mirrors trends in countries like the Netherlands and Denmark, where hybrid civil-criminal models have enhanced deterrence. Its prohibition of QuickPark places Ireland within the mainstream of EU merger enforcement practice, moving beyond a purely remedial approach.
Implications for M&A: No shortcuts in Deal Closing
For M&A practitioners and businesses, there are the following take-aways:
Notification Threshold Assessment: Always evaluate if a transaction triggers the Irish merger thresholds (based on parties’ turnover in Ireland). This includes share acquisitions, joint ventures, and asset acquisitions that might not look like full mergers. If in doubt, err on the side of notifying or seek informal guidance; the cost of a filing is far lower than a potential gun-jumping fine or void transaction.
Standstill Obligations: Once a notifiable deal is signed and submitted, do not implement any integration steps until CCPC (and any other required authorities) give the green light. That means no transfer of business control, no joint management, and caution in exchanging competitively sensitive information. The CCPC’s active enforcement means even soft gun-jumping (such as coordinating market strategies or pricing with your future subsidiary before clearance) could be scrutinised.
Internal Coordination: Ensure the deal teams, both legal and commercial, understand the importance of the standstill period. Integrations planning is fine, but it must remain clean-team based and conditional. Sales or supply chain teams should not start acting as one company prematurely. If the CCPC is investigating a gun-jumping case now, it likely wants to set a precedent; do not become the example.
Global Transactions: If your transaction requires approvals in multiple countries, remember Ireland is one of them when thresholds apply. It can be easy to focus on larger jurisdictions and overlook Irish filing needs, but the CCPC will notice if a global deal quietly closes its Irish leg without notification. The CCPC’s increasing cooperation within the ECN means they share intelligence with European counterparts.
In addition to competition-law considerations, transactions involving foreign investment now also fall under the Irish FDI screening regime. The Screening of Third Country Transactions Act 2023 introduces a mandatory notification and review system for certain transactions by non-EU/EEA investors that pose risks to security or public order. The regime came into force on 6 January 2025, and covers transactions meeting criteria such as a third-country investor acquiring control of an asset or undertaking in Ireland, a value threshold (currently €2 million), and involvement in specified critical sectors.
Deal documentation must now reflect the possibility of Irish FDI review as well as competition clearance, with timing, warranties and condition precedent provisions structured accordingly. Transactions should no longer treat Ireland only as a competition-clearance jurisdiction but must reflect both merger control and FDI screening obligations. Non-notification under the new FDI law can result in a fine not exceeding €4 million and/or up to 5 years imprisonment. The Act also gives the Minister power to “call-in” past transactions (completed in certain windows) that should have been notified or give rise to security/public order concerns, even if they fell outside the mandatory notification criteria.
Conclusion
The 2024 Annual Report confirms that the CCPC has evolved into a confident and assertive competition authority. It is faster at clearing unproblematic mergers, tougher on problematic ones, more coordinated internationally, and increasingly willing to use its new administrative powers. For businesses, this means that competition law risk is now integral to transaction planning, pricing strategies, and internal compliance frameworks. Ireland’s enforcement environment has matured, and companies should adjust their governance and deal processes accordingly.
