First decision under the Danish call-in rules – September 2026

17 September 2026

The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority has for the first time made a decision following the Danish “call-in” rules. The decision concerns Uber’s acquisition of Dantaxi (Danish taxi company) and was subject to a substantive competition assessment and a relatively long case handling of almost one year. Uber’s acquisition of Dantaxi was approved but included substantial commitments.

Brief overview of the case

Uber International Holding B.V. (“Uber”) and Dale LuxCo S.à r.l., a private equity vehicle company controlled by Triton Partners and certain minority shareholders, entered into an agreement on 27 May 2025 for Uber to acquire 100 per cent of the shares in Greenfleet Holding A/S (“Dantaxi”), Denmark’s largest taxi company. The transaction was completed on the same day, giving Uber sole control of Dantaxi.

The parties’ turnover did not exceed the standard notification thresholds under the Danish Competition Act, and the transaction was therefore not subject to a mandatory merger notification to the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (“the Authority”). However, on 25 August 2025, almost three months after the transaction was completed, the Authority required the transaction to be notified in order to obtain approval following the call-in rules in the Danish Competition Act. This was the first time the Authority made use of the call-in rules, which resulted in a case that proceeded to a full review.

The Authority identified several competition concerns arising from the merger, including that Uber’s position in the Greater Copenhagen taxi market would be significantly strengthened, with a risk of the market “tipping” in Uber’s favour.

The merger was ultimately approved subject to significant commitments in the Danish Competition Council decision on 24 August 2026. Among other things, Uber was required to divest one of Dantaxi’s two taxi despatch companies, accept restrictions on its relationship with the competing platform Drivr, and maintain certain notice periods for taxi drivers affiliated with Dantaxi. The Authority concluded that these commitments fully addressed the identified competition concerns.

  1. The Danish call-in rules

As a rule, mergers are only subject to merger control in Denmark if the merger include a change of control and the turnover thresholds set out in the Danish Competition Act are exceeded. If that is the case, the merger must be notified to, and approved by, the Authority before it is completed.

As an exception, the Authority obtained authorisation on 1 July 2024 to require a merger to be notified even though the parties’ turnover does not exceed the general thresholds. If the following two conditions are fulfilled, the Authority may require a merger to be notified after the “call-in” rules:

  1. the companies participating in the merger must have a combined annual turnover in Denmark exceeding DKK 50m; and
  2. the Authority has assessed that there is a risk that the merger will significantly impede effective competition, in particular by creation or strengthening of a dominant position.

If both conditions are met, the Authority may order the parties of the transaction to notify the merger. Generally, such an order must be issued no later than 15 working days after the Authority becomes aware of the merger, and no later than three months after the merger agreement was concluded, the takeover bid was published, or control was acquired.

The call-in rule is a targeted expansion of the Authority’s jurisdiction, designed to capture so-called “killer acquisitions” and other transactions that fall below the general turnover thresholds in the Danish Competition Act that significantly restricts competition, particularly in concentrated markets.

Uber/Dantaxi was together with another transaction regarding OneMed’s acquisition of Kirstine Hardam, the first transaction to be subject to the newly implemented “call-in” rules in Denmark.

The OneMed/Kirstine Hardam case concerned OneMed’s proposed acquisition of its competitor Kirstine Hardam in the market for ostomy aids and related services to Danish local authorities. As the transaction had not yet been completed, the call-in order meant it could not be implemented while pending approval from the Authority. The parties never submitted a final notification and subsequently on 8 June 2026, they announced the transaction was abandoned without the Authority making a decision.

  1. Our observations

Uber/Dantaxi and OneMed/Kirstine Hardam are currently the only two transactions that have been subject to the Danish “call-in” rules. Even though the outcome in the two cases is very different, they both illustrate the significant impact the call-in rules may impose on transactions in concentrated markets.

In the OneMed/Kirstine Hardam case, the parties abandoned the transaction prior to a decision from the Authority. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that this was due to unacceptable commitments that could adequately address the Authority’s competition concerns.

In the Uber/Dantaxi case, by contrast, Uber was able to offer, after several rounds of revision, commitments that the Authority considered sufficient to remove the identified competition concerns. The call-in rule can therefore have severe effects for the transactions it applies to.

The Uber/Dantaxi case also illustrates that a call-in review can take a very long time to conclude. Almost a full year passed between the Authority’s call-in decision on 25 August 2025 and its final decision on 24 August 2026, including a so-called Phase II investigation (full review), several rounds of suggested commitments, and two extensions of the statutory deadline.

For companies and investors, this underlines that the risk of a call-in should be assessed carefully and at an early stage of the transaction process, alongside the assessment of whether the general notification thresholds in Denmark are met. This is particularly important in concentrated markets, where the parties involved are close competitors, or where a transaction may significantly strengthen a party’s market position and thus becoming a dominant player.

By Mathilde Raahede Ebbesen Kramer and Vibeke Hammershøi